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IN MEMORIAM - CHARLES NAGEL
both." But the dilemma did not paralyze his action. In his pro-
fessional work he continued to go forward gallantly and cou-
rageously, firm in the belief, which he often expressed, that an
essentially just cause will win in the end.
In his faith, in the works to which it led, and in the person-
ality that all who knew him loved, Mr. Nagel represented the
finest flowering of Western liberal culture. With variations in
detail-often in such vital detail as readiness to resort to arms-
it rules in the "democracies" today. Whether it can be adequate
to the tasks that lie at hand, we shall soon know. Whether, if it
proves inadequate, there can come to bloom a different flowering
which preserves the most precious values of the old, presents the
future's weightiest enigma.
CHARLES NAGEL: A SKETCH OF HIS
PROFESSIONAL LIFE
HARRY W. KROEGERt
Any attempt to render an appreciation of Mr. Nagel as a
lawyer runs risk of inadequacy. The risk is indeed great when
the attempt is made by one who was in association with him only
during the last seventeen years of his life. More than seventy
years of an active and useful life had been spent and more than
fifty years of active practice had preceded, of which the written
record is largely obliterated.
The task is somewhat lightened by that charming volume "A
Boy's Civil War Story" which Mr. Nagel wrote upon the insis-
tence of his family and friends, by glimpses of his own past
which he sometimes gave in reminiscence, and by the picture of
the man in the age of his serenity.
He was born August 9, 1849 in Southern Texas of German
parents. His father, Herman Nagel, was a physician, a graduate
of the University of Berlin; his mother, the daughter of a Lu-
theran clergyman. They had come to this country in protest
again "system" and in search of individual freedom. The son,
until his fourteenth year, lived an unusual boyhood in a rugged
frontier community. The impress of the great plain, its vivid
t Member of the St. Louis, Missouri, Bar.
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light and color, affected, as we know, the artistic tastes of his
later life. The expansiveness of its image, together with the
individualism that was his heritage and the self-reliant inde-
pendence of frontier people, not to speak of the constant invita-
tion to adventure, were bound to have their counterparts in the
makeup of the mature man.
During the Civil War, Mr. Nagel's father, owing to Northern
sympathies, was forced to give up his frontier practice, and with
his son, take flight from Texas. The course was a long one by
horse and wagon, through southern Texas to San Antonio, and
through Mexico to Monterey and thence to Matamoras. It was
one of privation and hardship, punctuated by lasting impressions
of Mexican life with its contrast of the religious ardors of the
Christmas Carnival on one hand, and the brutality of bull fights
and revolutionary riots on the other. These were the days when
the throne of the unfortunate Maximilian was tottering.
At last, after a voyage by sea to New York, and by train to
St. Louis, father and son in 1864 arrived in the community that
was to be their permanent home. There were, no doubt, for the
boy, problems of reconciliation of his early development with the
environment of a more settled and already populous community.
The selection of the law as a career was not one that was
premeditated. The impulse was described by him as having come
after the conclusion of his general education at Central High
School (then at Fifteenth and Olive Streets), and after his re-
turn from a trip to Europe with his friend, Washington E.
Fischel, upon the reading of a sixty-cent second-hand volume of
Goodrich's "British Eloquence." The volume passed into his
hands at just the right moment of his life, and his reaction to
what he termed the "unforgettable words" of Burke and Pitt,
was spontaneous. Those who knew him will recognize that his
response was to the call of a profession dedicated to the per-
formance of a public service. True to the impulse which moti-
vated his entrance into the profession he maintained throughout
his life a profound respect for the English system of law. Its
greatness he ascribed to its flexibility and growth and to the
understanding by its judges of their problem as one of continu-
ous, vital readaptation.'
He obtained his legal education in 1870-72 at St. Louis Law
1. 1 Heller, Charles Nagel-Speeches and Witings, 1900-1928 (1931) 84.
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School, now Washington University Law School, and served his
apprenticeship in the office of Glover and Shepley, then an out-
standing firm in the middle west. A second trip to Europe, this
time with his parents, afforded opportunity for study at the Uni-
versity of Berlin, where he came under the influence of Rudolph
Gneist, a great exponent in those days of the English system of
law.
Early ventures in the practice of the law were in association
with such men as Nathaniel Myers, Fred Wislizenus, and Henry
I. D'Arcy.
In the late eighties when Mr. Nagel was practicing on his own,
Daniel N. Kirby became associated with him. This association
ripened into a partnership in 1894 which was remarkable not
only for the harmonious counterpoise of the two men, but also
for its duration. It continued, with various additions to and
changes in its membership, until Mr. Nagel's death on January
5, 1940, with only the interruption occasioned by Mr. Nagel's
services in the Cabinet of President Taft from 1909 to 1913.
From 1903 upon the addition of Judge Finkelnburg to the firm
until the latter's appointment to the Federal Bench, the firm
existed as "Finkelnburg, Nagel and Kirby." It continued at the
date of Mr. Nagel's death under the name "Nagel, Kirby, Orrick
and Shepley."
Like his professional associations his relationships with clients
were mainly of long enduring nature. Of these, his relationship
with the late Adolphus Busch was indeed remarkable. During
the early days of his independent practice, Mr. Nagel had become
acquainted at a stockholders' meeting with Mr. Busch, and it was
not long thereafter that the latter began to entrust him with
matters of increasing importance. That relationship continued
through three generations of the Busch family, and it gave Mr.
Nagel profound gratification in his later years to be able to
acknowledge what he termed an "underwriting for his life" by
the grandfather and to be able to meet the grandsons "with
trust and confidence as of yore.
' 2
From 1895 to 1909, Mr. Nagel lectured at the Washington
University Law School, whose faculty then consisted of leading
members of the practicing bar. Among his courses was Consti-
2. Response at dinner given June 8, 1939, in honor of Robert McKittrick
Jones and Charles Nagel.
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tutional Law, which he later recalled with the comment that he
was not confident that his students became impressed with the
precise conclusions of the Supreme Court but was confident that
they went away with more respect for our institutions than they
had had before.
His membership on the Board of Trustees of Washington Uni-
versity, his services in the State Legislature, as President of the
City Council, and in the Presidential Cabinet, and his services
to many educational and charitable causes, belong to another
story.
Mr. Nagel, despite his reputation as a public speaker, was not
frequently active in court work. More often his services were
directed, with an eye to the ultimate good of his clients, toward
the composition of their difficulties, if at all possible. There was,
moreover, a natural distaste for the machinations which are so
often met in the court room practice.
However, there were several cases of note whose substance
are available in the reports, which can scarcely go without men-
tion even in so short a sketch.
The case of Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Fred Miller
Brewing Co.,3 involved the question whether the name "Bud-
weiser," which in the public mind had become associated with
the product of Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association and under
which the latter had built up an extensive business, might be
used by another competing brewer where such use was unac-
companied by any other imitation. That case had a profound
influence upon the later development of the law of unfair compe-
tition, establishing that geographical names, although not ca-
pable of registration as trademarks, could acquire secondary sig-
nificance in connection with their use to designate a particular
product, which would be protected so as to prevent fraud or
imposition upon the buying public.4 To Mr. Nagel is attributable
the conception of the now familiar, but then novel, principle an-
nounced by the case. As in the case of most new principles,
unsupported by precedent, it met in the first instance with ex-
pressions of doubt, even by those whom he had associated with
him, but its advocacy was an example of that faith which he had
3. (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1898) 87 Fed. 864.
4. See Note (1908) 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 729, 733; Note (1910) 26 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 73, 77.
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in the elasticity of the law reacting under the influence of ethical
proprieties and its continuous readjustment to new conditions.
Characteristic of Mr. Nagel's personal deference, his name does
not appear of record in the case,-since it had arisen in a foreign
jurisdiction, he declined to have his name appear with that of
local counsel.
Shortly afterwards came the litigation in which Mr. Nagel
represented the Cherokee Nation of Indians, in its assertion of
claims against the Government under a treaty of removal be-
tween the United States and the Cherokee Nation made in 1838.
5
In this litigation he was successful in obtaining for groups of
the Nation large sums of money which had been promised for
the removal of members of the Nation from their original homes
in Southeastern United States to Indian Territory. The situa-
tion of these Indians, deprived for many years of the enjoyment
of their treaty rights as a result of governmental red tape, was
one which had an undoubted appeal to Mr. Nagel's interest.
When already over the age of eighty, Mr. Nagel again ap-
peared in the Supreme Court of the United States in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission.6 The Federal
Trade Commission had proceeded against the Shoe Company for
violation of the Clayton Act in purchasing the capital stock of
a moribund shoe company, the McElwain Company, located on
the eastern seaboard. It had been shown that in fact the pur-
chaser had produced a product differing as to quality and price
from that of the McElwain Company, and that the markets of
the two companies were in different sections of the country and
in different types of communities. The McElwain Company, be-
ing in failing circumstances would, but for the transaction, have
been eliminated as a factor in competition. Yet the Federal Trade
Commission had found that the effect of the acquisition was to
lessen substantially competition and ordered divestiture. The
Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the order of the Commis-
sion and the Supreme Court had in the first instance declined
to take jurisdiction. Upon motion for rehearing the Supreme
Court finally took jurisdiction. The record and briefs were volu-
minous, and the legal issues which the Government came pre-
pared to argue were many and involved. Then, as one Govern-
5. United States v. Cherokee Nation (1906) 202 U. S. 101.
6. (1930) 280 U. S. 291.
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ment attorney is reported to have said,-"A dignified old gentle-
man arose and told a story." That story in its essential equities
was so compelling that it resulted in a complete reversal by the
Supreme Court of the rulings below.
Remarkable as may be some of Mr. Nagel's rare appearances
in the court room, the emphasis, in an appreciation of his ser-
vices as a lawyer, justly belongs upon his work as a counsellor,
rather than upon that as a barrister. In the office it was recur-
rently his function to point the way when the issue seemed be-
clouded or the proper policy to be pursued seemed to be in doubt.
Unfortunately, such a contribution, while it suffers in dignity
and value by no comparison, lends itself neither to monumental-
izing nor to adequate exposition. This is true because the ser-
vices, for the most part, would take on meaning only in relation-
ship to situations difficult, if not incapable, of reconstruction.
Moreover the element of confidence attached to much of the work
of the counsellor renders it, in a peculiar sense, the exclusive
property of the client. The most that can or may be here at-
tempted is of necessity closely limited to generalities.
Although the nature of the talents which make for a man's
success often defy analysis, certain powers might, in Mr. Nagel's
case, have been clearly discerned,-the powers to perceive the
true issues in a case and to see them in their larger perspective.
The power to analyze the facts of the case and to find in them
the real issue,-the issue whose moral implications could lead
only to one result or conclusion,-existed in him in a remarkable
degree. To the assimilation of the facts of a case he gave pa-
tience and receptiveness. His was not an approach in which ten-
tative conclusions, invoked by the application of this or that
principle of law, are drawn and altered, but rather an approach
characterized by complete suspension of judgment until all avail-
able facts were comprehended. The case became formulated in
the suggestion of an issue (often interposed in the form of a
question), which might previously have been overlooked, but
which in his way of putting it assumed undoubted persuasive-
ness.
The method, in a word, was clearly empirical. The facts must
be sifted, the issues reduced to simplicity, and then the solution
followed as of course from the application of a few principles
of law. The method was not characterized by the bringing to
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss2/12
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bear upon the problem of multiple abstract principles of law.
In fact his disparagement of the thought that a case could have
many dominant abstract principles involved is well illustrated
by his comment upon his meeting a learned practitioner absorbed
in the intricacies of his case. The man had answered, in reply
to a question as to how he was progressing, that he had eleven
reasons why the Court could not do other than decide in his
favor. Mr. Nagel commented, "I am afraid you will lose." That
remark was far from a disparagement of diligence, for no man
knew better than the speaker a lawyer's anxiety for his case, nor
was capable of a greater dedication to the task.
The striving to discern, to grasp and to throw into relief the
morally appealing issue derived from an abiding conviction that,
however much the practical function of the law demanded its
reconciliation with administrative expediency on the one hand
and economic and social needs on the other, its guiding forces
were moral. By this was meant, not that the law evolved directly
in conformity with the lofty moral standards of the idealist, but
that it developed under the influence of that "sense of propriety
upon which every community insists for itself."'7 Lord Haldane
referred to such force as that of "Sittlichkeit." The conviction
in a sense finds counterpart in the observation that the judicial
process first selects the right and wrong and then rationalizes it.
Many of the views expressed by Mr. Nagel hark back upon
his underlying philosophy of the growth of the law-for in-
stance, the view that a statute is bound to fail if it provides a
rule of action which the public cannot be compelled or is unwill-
ing to adopt, or the view that the English judges were great
because "they were able to raise the standard of conduct to the
highest point that the people would stand."8
However, what concerns us the most here is that his philoso-
phy was a living thing, and furnished a guiding principle for
the day's work. With such orientation he stood in contrast not
only with those who subordinated the moral element to precedent,
but also with those who subordinated it to economic or social
philosophy. Both forgot and forget that the end of law is a
moral one. He never forgot that, nor could have been fairly
7. 1 Heller, Charles Nagel--SpeeChes and Writings, 1900-1928 (1931)
43-44.
8. Id. at 84.
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accused of abandoning the respect for tradition which occasioned
his entry into the profession or of abhorring adjustments to a
changing world.
Probably the facility for bringing the real moral issue to the
fore motivated the incident about to be told. Many years ago
one of our esteemed citizens, prosecuted for alleged participation
in a bribery of public officials, sought to employ Mr. Nagel to
defend him. Mr. Nagel listened to the story, and then modestly
said, "You know, I'm not a criminal lawyer." The reply was,
"But, I'm not a criminal." Upon trial of the case, the Court
directed a verdict of acquittal. It may be imagined that there
were instances of the reverse,-where a prospective client, with
none too good a conscience, checked an impulse to come to Mr.
Nagel. But of those instances we will probably never know.
To his early self-development, to his diversified experience, and
to the breadth of his interests may be attributed his power to
see a problem in deeper perspective, and to visualize the ultimate
consequences of an act. There are those who struggle for an
immediate principle to its vindication, and then find that with
their eyes on the immediate rather than the ultimate, they have
won victories without accomplishment. Sometimes such a strug-
gle is motivated by vindictiveness or obstinacy. More often it
is the unhappy manifestation of failing to perceive a situation
before it has arisen. In Mr. Nagel the power of such perception
was a rare gift.
To some will be suggested by these remarks the somewhat
typical picture of the man sitting at his desk in the midst of a
group, scarcely participating in the conversation passing to and
fro, alternating his apparent attention between the Mississippi
River and a bit of licorice being broken on an ever present mor-
tar. In the developing heat of the conference, someone might
determine upon a course of action or raise an issue with an-
other. Time after time in such a conference, when the parties
had spoken, there would come from Mr. Nagel, in quiet voice,
a simple question, and then there would be a lull, in which the
parties came to realize a shortsightedness in their course of
action or ultimate futility in their disagreements.
Whether as barrister or counsellor the attitude was always
thoughtful and serious,-so much so that many missed the essen-
tial truth that he could rejoice in a circus, or make a companion
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss2/12
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of a child. The seriousness with which he approached a task
may be appreciated from his confession that he never made a
speech not preceded by hours of apprehension and begun with
tremor. Nor did he ever seek to overcome the symptoms,-they
were to him the normal symptoms of an earnest man.
Whether as barrister or as counsellor he spoke with convic-
tion,-the objective conviction of his cause,-but viewed his
accomplishment with modesty.
Throughout his life Mr. Nagel stood as an example of a lawyer
who placed his professional calling above personal gain, a con-
ception which was perhaps first inculcated by the precedent of
his father, who as a country doctor, alone of his profession in a
large radius of plain, fulfilled many a mission without personal
gain, and which matured in Mr. Nagel's studies of great lawyers
of the more distant past. Whatever the origin of the conception,
it was evidenced by sincere efforts, particularly in his later life,
on behalf of people in trouble whose limited means made the
employment of any lawyer prohibitive. Often he may have been
seen devoting hours of time to such a person. Often, of course,
his known willingness made him the object of imposition.
More basic principles of professional ethics in the relation-
ship of lawyer and client need not be discussed in the case of
a man who in fact went to quixotic extremes to avoid a position
that might seem equivocal or a gain that might seem improper.
Most of us will smile in affectionate memory when we recall that
he kept meticulous account of what he received by way of salary
as President of the City Council, and saw to it that he spent not
less than the amount so received for pictures to be given to a
public museum; that he refused to charge travelling expenses,
and that in at least one known instance he wanted to take into
consideration, in fixing a fee, personal gratification derived from
a task well done.
In public and professional life, he espoused the sanctity of indi-
vidual rights, a doctrine suffering from eclipse at the present
time, when it is popular to prefix with "rugged" the term "indi-
vidualism" and to abandon it as thereby condemned. But it
represents a trend of centuries, that struggle of the individual,
when not impinging upon the rights of others, to live freely and
fully, and who may say that, when calm is restored, those who
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